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The 1986-1987 Labor Board: Has the Pendulum
Slowed?t
Douglas E. Ray*
The 1986-87 period reviewed in the following Survey is notable for a number of
important developments in the area of labor and employment law. One of the most
important questions at the beginning of this time period, and the subject of this Intro-
duction, is the state and direction of the law with regard to employee rights in the
workplace, both in a union and non-union setting.
This question is particularly important when reviewing the recent decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board.' The fiftieth anniversary of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act' in 1985 was marked by many attacks on the Board's ability and willingness to
protect employees. Union leaders charged that labor laws had "been turned squarely
against" workers and unions and that unions should not even bother seeking protection
from the Board.' United Mine Workers President Richard L. Trumka, for example,
described Board decisions as "result-oriented" and stated that workers would be better
off if the Board were abolished and the Taft-Hartley Act revoked.' Similarly, AFL-CIO
President Lane Kirkland described the labor laws as a "dead-letter" and suggested that
workers might be "better off with the law of the jungle."'
t Copyright C 1988 Boston College Law School.
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law; B.A., University of Minnesota; J.D.,
Harvard University Law School. The author thanks Ms. Linda Whalen for her expert assistance.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is an adjudicative body heading the
federal agency bearing the same name. Section 3(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
provides that the National Labor Relations Board shall consist of five members "appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 29 U.S.C, § 153(a) (1982).
2 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 161-169 (1982)).
3 Remarks of James R. Herman, President of the International Longshoremen's and Ware-
housemen's Union, at the Pacific Coast Labor Law Conference (May 2-3, 1985), reported at 119
Lab. Rel. Rep. (RNA) 47, 48 (1985).
4 Remarks at University of Louisville Conference (April 24-25, 1986), reported at 122 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 25, 28 (1986).
5 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 16, 1984, at 8, col. 2, In a 1986 speech, Mr. Kirkland stated that
the labor board "operates largely as an accounting tool to enable the worst elements in business to
budget and limit their liability for breaking the law." Speech delivered to the AFL-CIO Convention
in Anaheim, California (Oct. 28, 1985), reprinted at Kirkland, VITAL SPEECHES, 132-36 (Dec. 15,
1985).
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These reactions and comments were motivated in part by a series of NLRB decisions
issued between 1983 and 1985 which overruled prior precedent. Some of these decisions
allowed employers to interrogate employees concerning their feelings about a union," to
relocate part of a company's facilities without first bargaining with the union over the
decision to relocate,' to discipline or discharge strikers for picket line misconduct under
a broader range of circumstances than had been allowed in the past," and to discipline
at least some employees for refusing to cross stranger picket lines." NLRB decisions also
narrowed the definition of "concerted activity" to allow employers to discipline or dis-
charge employees under certain circumstances for complaining to state commissions
about job safety.'"
This Introduction will review and analyze a sample of 1986-87 NLRB decisions to
determine how the current Board interprets these new standards in the area of employee
and union rights and determine whether, in light of recent substantial changes in Board
membership," the pendulum of change at the NLRB has slowed." Has filing charges
with the NLRB become futile? Is it "open season" on employees affiliated with unions
and strikers? Are unions in a bargaining relationship aided not at all by the law?
6
 Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 116 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984), enforced sub nom. Hotel
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006, 119 L.R.R.M. 2624 (9th Cir.
1985).
Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 115 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1984) (no duty to bargain regarding
company's relocation of research facilities; decision turned upon "significant change in the nature
and direction" of company's business); see also Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268
N.L.R.B. 601, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1984), enforced, 119 L.R.R.M. 2081 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (mid-term
work relocation to reduce labor costs, after bargaining with union but not securing its consent, is
not an unfair labor practice, because it does not violate express provision of labor contract).
Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 115 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1984) (striker's verbal
threats, unaccompanied by physical acts or menacing gestures, no longer per se protected against
discharge). The Board stated that Section 7's protection depends on whether the striker's miscon-
duct, under all the circumstances, "may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate" other employees.
Id. at 1046, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1115. In determining the reinstatement rights of unfair labor practice
strikers engaging in unprotected activities, the Board will no longer balance the severity of any
employer unfair labor practice against the gravity of the striker's misconduct. Id. at 1047, 115
L.R.R.M. at 1116.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1715, 118 L.R.R.M. 1201 (1985) (general
contract clause barring strikes will be interpreted by the Board to include sympathy strikes; em-
ployees who refuse to cross stranger picket line may be disciplined).
" Meyers Indus., Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 493, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 118 L.R.R.M. 2649 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (refusal by non-union employee to drive
allegedly unsafe truck and his complaint to state public service commission are not "concerted"
activity, because individual worker took such action on his own behalf anti not "with or on the
authority of other employees").
11
 Members Wilford Johansen, Marshall Babson, and James Stephens were appointed in 1985.
Member Mary Cracraft was appointed in 1986.
12
 For a recent and thoughtful review of labor law decisions at the Supreme Court, see Gould,
The Burger Court and Labor Law: the Beat Goes On — Mortal°, '25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 51 (1987).
Professor Gould suggests that Burger Court decisions "represent a continued swing of the pendulum
against the interests of organized labor." Id. at 76.
For a clear discussion of the 1986-87 Supreme Court decisions in the areas of labor and
employment law, see the speech by Professor Charles B. Craver, subtitled "Expanding Focus upon
Individual Rights and Pre-emption." 125 Lab. Rd. Rep. (BNA) 259 (1987) (text of Aug. 10, 1987
speech to ABA's Section of Labor and Employment Law).
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The answers to these questions are particularly important in the late 1980's. These
are critical times for labor organizations. The level of union representation has declined
from about '35 percent of the private non-agricultural workforce in the 1950's to about
18 percent currently." This decline in the level of representation has been attributed to
increasing employer resistance to organization and collective bargaining," the changing
composition of the workforce and jobs," high unemployment levels, and the combined
effects of foreign competition and deregulation." In an era of increasing resistance to
union activity, changes in law that make it more difficult for unions to organize or
maintain their representative status, even if not the sole cause of union decline, can
accelerate the trend.
The cases reviewed in this Introduction address employee rights in a union orga-
nizing campaign, 1 ? with particular emphasis on cases applying the Board's new rules for
determining when an employer may lawfully question an employee concerning his or
her feelings about a union," the collective bargaining process," the current Board's
stance on the stability of bargaining relationships, 2° the rights of striking employees"
and, finally, employee rights in a non-union setting. 22
I. EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND THE ORGANIZATION CAMPAIGN
Among the 1984 Board decisions criticized as destroying employee rights are those
involving interrogation of employees and employer speech and action during a union
organization campaign. The Board's 1984 decision in Rossmore House," which held that
interrogating individuals known to be union supporters will no longer be regarded as a
per se unfair labor practice but, rather, will be judged under "all the circumstances," has
been strongly criticized." Other decisions which permit employers to grant additional
13 124 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (discussing the January 1987 edition of EMPLOYMENT AND EARN-
INGS, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics). Unions still represent approximately 17 million
United States workers. Id. The remaining 80 million persons in the private workforce also have
rights under the NLRA. These rights also have been affected by recent changes. See infra notes
118-36 and accompanying text.
14 For a discussion of increased employer resistance to union representation by unlawful means,
see Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv.
L. REV. 1769 (1983).
Dickens & Leonard, Accounting for the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-80, 38 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 323 (1985).
113 Gould, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board
and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REV. 937,942 (1986).
0 See infra notes 23-61 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
2 ' See infra notes 73-97 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
22
 See supra note 6.
24 Professor Charles J. Morris has argued that the Rossmore House approach "represents an
invitation for employers to delve into employee sentiment about unions and thereby improve the
employer's election chances." C. Morris, Remarks at the Third Annual Multi-State Labor and
Employment Law Seminar, Dallas, Texas (Mar. 19-30, 1985), reported at 119 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
281,282 (1985).
4	 BOSTON COI I FGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:1
employee benefits before an election and permit employer speeches linking unionization
with plant closing have also met with strong criticism. 25
A. Interrogation
When the dispute has involved employers questioning employees concerning their
union feelings, the Board has continued to apply the Rossmore House standard and
reviewed cases of alleged interrogation on a case by case basis. In Rossmore House,26 the
Board adopted a "totality of circumstances" test in cases involving alleged interrogation
of open and active union supporters. The Rossmore House Board stated it would "weigh
the setting and nature of interrogations involving open and active union supporters,"
and listed four criteria for determining whether such questioning is unlawful under the
test: (1) the background; (2) the nature of the information sought; (3) the identity of
the questioner; and (4) the place and method of interrogation.27
The Rossmore House standards have led the Board to allow interrogation in certain
circumstances but have not led to an "open season" for employer questioning. In Tribune
Co.,28
 the Board panel held that interrogating employees did not violate the Act or
constitute objectionable conduct where the employees publicly supported the union.
Similarly, in Creative Food Design,29 the Board found that a manager did not act unlawfully
when he asked two employees the identities of persons who signed union authorization
cards despite the fact that, in the same discussion, the manager also unlawfully threatened
the employees with restaurant closure. The Board found that the inquiry would not
reasonably create a fear of reprisal and was not coercive where the employees were fully
aware that the employer already knew the card signers' identity. 2° Creative Food Design
demonstrates that the Rossmore House standards do affect the pre-election environment.
In other cases, while the Board majority has found some interrogation lawful, new .
Board members have registered their disagreement. In Super H Discount?' for example,
the Board panel majority found lawful an assistant store manager's inquiry to two
employees who were discussing a union authorization card over a store intercom. The
majority found the inquiry legal as a "single, isolated, and innocuous exchange.""
Member Johanson dissented, stating that "[a] supervisor's questioning of an employee
about her and other's union activities is not isolated and certainly not innocuous.""
Member Babson took a similar view of the law in Cartridge Actuated Devices. 34 This decision
involved a shop Floor conversation where a low level supervisor asked an employee what
he thought about the union. The employee responded that he was not sure but that
something had to be done to improve working conditions. Because the encounters
occurred on the shop floor, involved a low level supervisor and contained no threatening
22 Id. at 282-83.
26 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 116 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984).
" Id. at 1178 n.20, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1027 n.20.
28 279 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 123 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1986).
28 282 N.L.R.B. No. 171, 124 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1987).
" Id. at 6, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1275.
6 ' 281 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 123 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1986).
" Id. at 2, 123 L.R.R.M. 1178.
"Id. at 4, 123 L.R.R.M. 1042.
64 282 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 124 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1986).
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language, the .panel majority found no Section 8(a)(1) violation." Member Babson would
have found an unfair labor practice because the encounter occurred early in the cam-
paign at a time when the employer did not know whether the questioned employee was
an open and active labor supporter, was initiated by the supervisor, and occurred in the
context of other unfair labor practices. 36
Finally, the Board has found questioning to constitute unlawful interrogation in a
number of cases, sometimes over strong dissent by Chairman Dotson, one of the authors
of the Rossmore House approach. In Woodcliff Lake Hilton," for example, the panel found
that an assistant manager unlawfully requested that an employee report back to him
concerning any approaches for union support. In dissent, Chairman Dotson would have
found the exchange an informal conversation, and not a threat." In Hospital Management
Associates," the Board overruled the administrative law judge and found unlawful coer-
cive interrogation where an employee's immediate supervisor called her into his office
to speak privately and then asked her if she knew the union sympathies of specific
people. Atlantic Forest Products" involved an open and active union supporter who wore
a union button and told two supervisors about his union support. On the day before the
election, his supervisor waited until he was alone in the breakroom and asked him to
close the door. The supervisor then said,: "Dave, I am not supposed to talk to you but
just between me and you ... well, how are you going to vote?" The employee told him
he was going to vote "yes." 4 ' The Board found the questioning coercive and unlawful. 42
In some cases, interrogation has been viewed as serious enough, when accompanied
by other unlawful acts, to support issuing a bargaining order. In Well-Bred Loap 5 for
example, the shift supervisor asked employees, who had not openly declared their union
support, detailed questions concerning which employees engaged in union activity, which
had signed union cards, and whether the employees questioned had signed union
authorization cards. The questioning was accompanied by a warning not to sign a union
card and a threat that the owner would discharge all employees involved in union activity.
With the discharges of six employees in a unit of twenty-three, the interrogation was
held to support a bargaining order. 44
In summary, the standards for what constitutes an unlawful interrogation under
Rossmore House continue to evolve. It is not "open season" on employees. A test that
measures coercive impact under all the circumstances, however, invites employers to
come close to the boundary of unlawfulness and, because of the uncertainty about where
that line will be drawn, to sometimes go beyond it. It further encourages employers to
litigate cases of questionable legality.
"Id. at 4, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1044. The legislative provision refers to 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
4° 282 N.L.R.B. at 5 n.5, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1044 n.5.
" 279 N.L.R.B. No. 146, 123 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1986).
" Id. at 4-5, 123 L.R.R,M, at 1062-63.
"284 N.L.R.B. No, 5, 125 L.R.R.M. 1118 (1987).
40 282 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 124 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1987).
4 ' Id, at 5, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1130.
" Id. at 6, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1130.
43 280 N.L,R.B. No, 36, 124 L.R.R.M. 1012 (1986); see also Koons Ford, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 88,
124 L.R.R.M. 1167 (1986) (bargaining order based in part on unlawful interrogations); Briclgeway
Oldsmobile, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 123 L.R.R.M. 1267 (1986) (bargaining order based on inter-
rogation, threats to close, surveillance and discharge of union organizer).
44 280 N.L.R.B. No. 36 at 5, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1014.
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B. Speech and Other Interference
With regard to other forms of election interference, the current Board may not be
moving as far in a pro-employer direction as some critics fear. The Board continues to
find employer conduct unlawftil based on somewhat traditional analysis. In Playboy
Hotel,'" the Board found that the employer violated the Act and interfered with the
union election when it granted improved health insurance benefits before an election.
And, in Atlantic Forest Products,46 the Board directed a second election in part because
the employer withheld a regular pay raise and then attributed the event to the union's
election petition.
The Board still monitors the election atmosphere for implicit and explicit threats.
In Link Manufacturing Co.,47 the Board found that the employer unlawfully created an
atmosphere of surveillance by asking an employee how a union meeting had gone and
advising an employee that he knew thirty-six employees had signed union cards. In
Standard Products Co.," an election was overturned when the Board found that an
employer threatened employees with a loss of benefits and plant closure. Board members
disagree, however, about what constitutes an unlawful threat in the organizational con-
text. In Black & Decker Corp.," the panel majority found employer literature objectionable
when it implied that product lines and jobs would be lost in the event of unionization.
In dissent, Chairman Dotson argued for the employer's right to inform employees of
the "reasonably probable adverse consequences of unionization."" In Atlantic Forest
Products,5 ' by contrast, the Board overruled the administrative law judge's ruling that an
employer's speech was illegal when the employer stated that "in bargaining, so far as we
are concerned, everything starts from scratch and even the benefits and wages you now
have are bargainable."52 The employer went on to say:
We do not intend to let any union or anyone else force us to put your jobs
in danger and if the union calls you out on strike to try and force us to do
something which we think would hurt our business and affect your jobs,
then we'll simply face up to a strike and get people in here who want to do
the work or close the plant down if it can't be run efficiently. I repeat this will
only be done if' it can't be run efficiently."
The Board found the employer's speeches nothing more than "a partisan account,"
"mere partisan opinion," and "legitimate argument." 54
With regard to employer speech, it is difficult to tell when the Board will find a
speech coercive and unlawful and when it will find the speech "mere partisan opinion."
The newly evolving standard may also invite anti-union employers to engage in the kind
of brinkmanship which the Supreme Court warned against in its landmark case dealing
45 281 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 123 L.R.R.M. 1182 (1986).
46 282 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 124 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1987).
47 281 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 123 L.R.R.M. 1084 (1986).
" 281 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 124 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1986).
" 282 N.L.R.B. No. 156, 124 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1987).
"Id. at 10, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1212.
51 282 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 124 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1987).
52 Id. at 21-22, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
" Id. at 22, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1135 (emphasis in original).
54 Id, at 22-24, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1135-36.
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with the difference between lawful prediction and unlawful threat, NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co."
C. Access to the Election Mechanism
The Board does seem to guard employee rights more jealously in the area of access
to the NLRB election process. The Board has, for example, guarded employee rights to
complete freely the union authorization cards necessary to obtain an election. In Adco
Metals," the Board confirmed its practice of holding authorization cards in confidence
and found that the employer acted illegally when it advised employees that anyone
signing a union authorization card could expect to he subpoenaed as a witness. In Logo
7, Inc.," the Board held that the employer violated the Act by sending employees a
letter stating that, in some instances, the union discloses signed authorization cards to
the employer. The Board relied upon Adco to find this an unlawful threat, stating that
it "recognized the vital role played by the solicitation of authorization cards in an
organizational campaign and the chilling effect on the right of employees to signify their
union support if they know that their employer can readily ascertain their iclentity." 5s
Thus, while there are questions as to the degree employees are protected in the pre-
election period, their right to an election has not been compromised.
D. Conduct of Elections
Finally, it appears that the current Board will strictly construe procedures for con-
ducting elections. In Lemco Construction, Inc.," the Board certified the results of an
election where only one of eight eligible voters participated. A group of employees
wished to vote together but relied on an incorrect timepiece and arrived after the polls
were closed. The Board announced that the number of eligible employees who voted in
a representation election will no longer determine the election's validity so long as there
is adequate notice and opportunity to vote and employees are not prevented from voting
by the conduct of a party or unfairness in scheduling. 60 Because the employees' reason
for not voting was within their control, the Board found that the facts did not constitute
"unusual circumstances." 1
66 395 U.S. 575, 71 L.R.R.M. 2481 (1969). The Court noted that an employer "can easily make
his [or her) views known without engaging in 'brinkmanship' when it becomes all too easy to
'overstep and tumble lover) the brink.'" Id. at 620, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2498 (quoting Wausau Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F,2d 369, 372, 65 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2003 (7th Cir, 1967)).
w 291 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 123 L.R.R.M. 1245 (1986).
57 284 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 125 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1987).
55 Id. at 2, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1131. Thus, the Board guards access to the authorization card
process with some of the same intensity with which it guards access to the NLRB charge filing
mechanism. See Norris Concrete, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 123 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1986) (employer violated
Aci by threatening employees if they testify in NLRB proceedings or file charges, disciplining and
discharging employees for filing charges, and laying off an employee because his son had filed
charges).
"283 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 124 L.R.R.M. 1328 (1987), overruling Gold & Baker, 54 N.L.R.B. 869,
13 L.R.R.M. 235 (1944) and Kit Mfg. Co., 187 N.L.R.B. I, 81 L.R.R.M. 1136 (1971).
60 Id. at 5-6, l24 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
61 Id. at 6, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
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H. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Much of the criticism directed at the Board in recent years has been sparked by its
decisions in the collective bargaining area. In Otis Elevator Co.,62 the 1984 Board found
that the employer had no duty to bargain over its decision to relocate its research facilities
because the decision turned on a "significant change in the nature and direction" of the
business. In Garwood-Detroit Truck Equipment, Inc., 63 the 1985 Board held that the com-
pany's decision to subcontract the installation and servicing of its truck equipment was
not a mandatory bargaining subject. Even though the employer was trying to eliminate
significant labor costs through subcontracting, the Board determined that the decision
involved a "significant change in the nature and direction" of the business. 64 These
decisions posed a significant threat to a union's ability to negotiate over a partial closing
and attempt to preserve jobs.
A. The Duty to Bargain
With regard to the employer's duty to bargain over important business decisions,
the Board recently has issued decisions that may limit Garwood and Otis Elevator. In
Strawsine Manufacturing Co., 65 the Board found that the employer violated the Act by
failing to bargain with the union over its decision to close the plant and relocate the
work. The Board stated that an employer is not exempt from bargaining under Otis
when its decision is motivated by anti-union reasons. In Litton Systems," a more important
case, the Board found that the employer violated the Act by failing to bargain with the
incumbent union over its decision to relocate countertop oven production from Min-
nesota to South Dakota. Because the decision rested primarily on labor costs, the Board
viewed it as falling within the realm of mandatory bargaining. The majority, over a
strong dissent by Chairman Dotson,67 found that the union did not waive its right to
bargain either through a broad management rights clause in the contract, because the
clause did not specifically reserve to the employer the right unilaterally to transfer work,
or through its failure to challenge earlier layoffs.
Similarly, in Arrow Automotive," the Board found that the employer violated the Act
by failing to bargain to impasse before unilaterally closing one of four plants and
relocating the work to one of the remaining three. Again, the Board determined that
the decision was based on labor costs and was, therefore, a mandatory bargaining subject.
Litton and Arrow Automotive demonstrate that the current Board does impose some limits
on Olin's reach. The test of whether the management decision turns on labor costs will
not always be easy to apply, however, and no doubt will lead to lengthy litigation in many
cases. The employer in Arrow Automotive, for example, was ordered to pay over five
years' back pay to employees terminated due to the plant closing.
62 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 115 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1984).
6' 274 N.L.R.B. 113, 118 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1985). The facts of Garwood somewhat resembled
those or Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 57 L.R.R.M. 2607 (1964), where
the Supreme Court held that subcontracting did constitute a mandatory bargaining subject.
61 274 N.L.R.B. at 115, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1420.
6' 280 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 123 L.R.R.M. 1270 (1986).
56 283 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 125 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1987).
67 Id. at 15, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1085.
66 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 125 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1987).
December 1987]	 LABOR BOARD	 9
B. The Right to Information
The current Board has not been uniformly hostile to unions attempting to perform
their functions at the bargaining table. In a number of recent cases, for example, the
Board has protected the union's right to the information necessary to perform its role
as bargaining representative. In New York Post Corp.,°9 for example, the Board required
the employer to provide information and statistics on a variety of matters, including
equal employment opportunity, unit, non-unit and managerial personnel, work done by
subcontractors, in-house computer subcontractor personnel, and employee absenteeism
and sick leave use. In Nielson Lithographing Co.," the Board required the employer to
provide the union with financial information on the company. The employer's statement
that jobs would he lost and that the company would go out of business unless economic
concessions were made created the obligation to provide the information because the
statement implied an inability to pay. New unions, too, have received Board protection.
In Angelica Healthcare Services," the employer was required to furnish a newly certified
union with employee names, addresses, seniority dates, wages, hours, insurance and
pensions benefits, and disciplinary records.
The employer's duty to provide information has even extended to overcoming the
employer's right to exclude persons from its premises. In Hercules, Inc.," for example,
a union hygienist was granted access to the plant to investigate accidents, conduct health
and safety inspections, and test for toxic or hazardous fumes.
III. STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
The 1984-85 Board issued decisions that significantly affected the conduct and
regulation of strikes. Standards for determining when an employer may fire a striker
for picket line misconduct were changed in Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc." Indianapolis Power
& Light Co." held that a broad no-strike clause in a contract bars sympathy strikers. In
the strikes and lockouts area, the 1986-87 Board has not modified its earlier positions.
Recent cases strictly apply the Clear Pine Mouldings test, expand an employer's power in
a lockout situation, and change the analysis used to determine whether an employer
may withdraw recognition from a union in a strike situation.
A. Striker Misconduct
In picket line violence cases, the Board continues to protect the rights of persons
seeking to cross picket lines by a fairly strict construction of Clear Pine Mouldings." This
case held that an employer is justified in not reinstating a striker whose "misconduct is
such that, under the circumstances existing, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intimi-
62 283 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 124 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1987).
7° 279 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1986). The Board distinguished Atlanta Hilton
& Tower, 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 117 L.R.R.M. 1224 (1984), where the Board found that employer
references to the economy and industries in financial trouble did not convey an inability to pay
sufficient to trigger the duty to provide financial information.
71 280 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 123 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1986).
72 281 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 124 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1986).
"268 N.L.R.B. 1044, il5 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1984).
" 273 N.L.R.B. 1715, 118 L.R.R.M. 1201.(1985).
75 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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date employees in the exercise of rights protected under the Act." 6 If the employer can
prove its allegations," it seemingly may discharge employees under the Clear Pine Mould-
ings test for actions that cause no physical harm. In GSM, Inc., 78 for example, the
employer discharged a group of employees who had either slapped, kicked or thrown
beer cans at vehicles crossing the picket line. In overruling the administrative law judge,
the Board found that the employees' behavior disqualified them from reinstatement
because:
Conduct such as kicking, slapping, and throwing beer cans at moving vehicles
is intimidating enough in and of itself without being accompanied by addi-
tional threats of a "threatening or violent demeanor." Further, while such
conduct might be "relatively innocuous" when measured against more violent
behavior, it nevertheless is violent conduct which may reasonably tend to
coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of the rights protected under
the Act."
Another employee who was discharged had strategically parked his van so picketers
could hide behind it and throw rocks. In addition, when he was following a company
truck in his van, another employee, his passenger, jumped out of the van to throw a
cinder block at the truck. The Board found this employee was in "active cooperation""
with picketers engaged in coercive and intimidating conduct and could be discharged.
Similarly, in Cartridge Actuated Devices, 81 the Board stated that "[w]e do not agree ... with
the judge's observation that ... kicking a vehicle is the type of impulsive behavior that
can be expected on a picket line during the course of a lengthy and tense strike. -62
An employee may not safely claim provocation or retaliation as a defense for his or
her picket line activity. In Richmond Recording Corp.," the Board upheld the discharge of
a striker for tossing nails on the employer's main driveway, even though the striker
claimed he acted in retaliation for nails thrown under picketers' cars by guards and
replacement workers. The Board stated that "two wrongs do not make a right." 84 In the
same case, the Board upheld the discharge of a striker who hit a car with a stick after
the car hit the striker while crossing the picket line. The Board found that the incident
was precipitated by picketers who approached the car with sticks and intimidated the
driver.
" 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1115 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. W,C. McQuaid, Inc., 552
F.2d 519, 528, 94 L.R.R.M. 2950, 2955 (3d Cir. 1977)).
"See Louisiana-Pacific, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 183, 125 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1987) (employer violated
Act by discharging striker despite honest but mistaken belief that striker had thrown rocks at
company van).
" 284 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 125 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1987).
" Id. at 3-4, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1134.
88 Id. at 4, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1139. Member Babson found that the driver's participation in the
cinder block incident was, standing alone, sufficient to warrant discharge. Id. at 4 n.10, 125 L.R.R.M.
at 1134 n.10.
81 282 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 124 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1986).
82 1d. at I n.1, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1043 n.1 (citing Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044,
115 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1984)).
"280 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 124 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1986).
" Id. at 4, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1082.
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B. Access to Property
While continuing to monitor the bounds of striker behavior, the current Board has
recognized that picketing strikers do have the right under the Act to convey effectively
their message to the public and other employees, at least when they do so peaceably.
This right can outweigh the employer's property interests. In Schwab Foods," the Board
found that a struck grocery store violated the Act by prohibiting picketing in the walkway/
vestibule area in front of the grocery store and an adjoining drugstore. The only access
to the area was from a parking lot maintained jointly by the two stores. The Board
majority held, after balancing the Section 7 rights against those of the property owner,"
that the employee's Section 7 rights prevailed and the employer could neither refuse
striking employees access nor limit their picketing to outside the parking lot entrance.
The panel majority noted that the Section 7 rights of the employee-strikers in Schwab
Foods were stronger than those of the non-employee picketers denied access to the
employer's property in the recent Fairmont Hotel decision.87
C. Post-Strike Reactions
Sometimes the Board's commitment to protecting a person's freedom to honor or
not to honor picket lines leads to decisions favoring strikers. In Summa Corp.," the Board
found that an employer violated the Act when it threw a $4000 party for the 168 persons
who had abandoned a strike which ended two and one-half months earlier. The Board
found discriminatory the employer's failure to invite those who did not abandon the
strike and rejected the employer's alleged justification that the party was necessary to
reduce post-strike tensions. Chairman Dotson, in dissent, would have found the alleged
business justification sufficient. 89
D. Lockout Issues
In a major decision that may affect employer and union strategies at bargaining
impasse, the Board held in Harter Equipment 9° that absent specific proof of anti-union
motivation, an employer lawfully may use temporary replacement workers during a
lawful lockout. The Board found this action reasonably adapted to achieving a legitimate
employer interest which has only a comparatively slight adverse effect on protected
employees rights.gi In Birkenwald, Inc., 92 where temporary replacements were hired for
88 284 N.L.R.B, No, 120, 125 L.R,R.M, 1225 (1987).
88 Application of a balancing test, of course, depends on the person who is doing the balancing.
Chairman Dotson dissented. Id. at 12, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1233.
87 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 123 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1986).
8B 282 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 124 L.R.R.M. 1089 (1987).
99 Id. at 10-14, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1091-92 (Dotson, Chairman, dissenting).
9° 280 N.L.R.B, No. 71, 122 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1986). The Board stated:
[A]s a general rule ... an employer does not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1), absent
specific proof of antiunion motivation, by using temporary employees in order to
engage in business operations during an otherwise lawful lockout, including a lockout
initiated for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of a
legitimate bargaining position.
Id. at 11-12, 122 L.R.R.M. at 1223.
°' Id. at 10, 122 L.R.R.M. at 1222.
92 282 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 124 L.R.R.M. 1239 (1987).
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locked out drivers and warehouse employees, Member Stephens indicated that he would
prefer a balancing test such as that advocated by former Chairman Miller in 1972"
rather than the Harter Equipment formula. 94 The implications of the Harter Equipment
holding remain to be seen. Management infrequently uses lockouts, but this holding
may increase their usage.
E. Status of Strike Replacements
Finally, in Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 95 the Board held that it will no longer presume
that replacement workers hired during a strike support the union in the same ratio as
employees engaged in the walkout.96 The Board held that the employer unlawfully
refused to continue bargaining with an incumbent union because it lacked sufficient
objective proof to establish a good faith doubt that the union had lost its majority support.
This case may make it easier for an employer to withdraw recognition in a strike situation.
IV. CONTINUITY OF THE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP
It is in the area of protecting the continuity of bargaining relationships that the
current Board demonstrates that it is not an agency committed to destroying unions. In
cases dealing with successorship issues and attempted withdrawal of recognition from
incumbent unions, it has, with the exception of the Buckley Broadcasting° case, maintained
prior Board standards and issued decisions protecting the incumbent union. Thus, it is
not fair to say that the Board has proclaimed "open season" on incumbent unions.
A. Successorship
With regard to successorship issues, the Board has decided a number of cases in
which an employer purchased a company with union-represented employees and at-
tempted to avoid hiring a majority of the predecessor's workforce in order to avoid
incurring a duty to bargain with the union. In State Distributing Co.," the Board found
that an employer that acquired a wine distributorship qualified as a successor employer
even though it did not hire a majority of its employees from the predecessor's workforce.
The Board found the successor's failure to hire its predecessor's employees illegally
motivated by a desire to avoid having a majority of its workforce represented by a union.
The Board determined that some of the predecessor's employees failed to submit em-
ployment applications because of the "climate of futility" engendered by the employer's
remarks.99 Similar results were reached in American Press, Inc. 199 and basal Caring Centers,
Inc."'
" See Inter Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.13, 177, 177-79, 81 L.R.R.M. 1508, 1510-12 (1972)
(Miller, Chairman, concurring), enforced, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938, 84
L.R.R.M. 2924 (1974).
" 282 N,L.R.B. No. 130 at 5, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1240.
95 284 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 125 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1987).
96 Id. at 17, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1286.
97 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
99 282 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 124 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1987).
99 Id. at 2, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1241.
1
"280 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 123 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1986).
1 " 280 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 124 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1986).
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State Distributing is also noteworthy because of the Board's response to an argument
concerning the appropriate remedy for the employer's unilateral and illegal reduction
of wages and benefits. The employer argued that under the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit's ruling in Love's Barbeque Restaurant,'"! a "make whole"
remedy for the entire five year period since the successor took over was not appropriate.
The employer urged that the higher wage and benefit rate (the former contractual rate)
should be paid for only a "reasonable time of bargaining" because bargaining in 1982
would likely have led to an impasse after which the employer could have lawfully reduced
wages. Rejecting this argument, the Board stated:
With respect, we continue to adhere to our view that, in circumstances like
those here and in Love's Barbeque, it is appropriate to calculate backpay on
the basis of the contractual rates paid by the predecessor (in other words,
the existing terms and conditions of employment) because the successor's
unlawful failure to recognize and bargain with the union has left us without
an adequate or reasonable alternative basis for calculating what rates would
have been arrived at through lawful bargaining. As noted above in connec-
tion with the uncertainties regarding hiring, it is proper to resolve uncer-
tainties against the one whose unlawful acts have created those uncertain-
ties.' "
The Board noted that there was no certain way to determine whether the parties might
have agreed, had there been bargaining, to a wage rate lower than the contract rate but
higher than the rate unilaterally imposed and, if they had agreed, what the rate might
have been and when it might have been implemented.
B. Withdrawal of Recognition
The Board has also had the opportunity to consider a number of cases in which an
employer has attempted to withdraw recognition from a union by alleging that the union
no longer has majority support. The general rule has been that an employer may not
lawfully withdraw recognition from an incumbent union because of its asserted doubt
of the union's continued majority status, unless the assertion is based on objective
considerations sufficient to provide the employer reasonable grounds for believing that
its employees no longer desire union representation. 1 U4 Such asserted doubt may not be
raised in the context of employer unfair labor practices aimed at causing employees to
abandon the union. 105 In recent cases, the Board has rejected employer arguments of
reasonable doubt both because of insufficient evidence and employer wrongdoing. As
noted above, 106 however, the Board has changed the rule for determining the replace-
ment workers' union feelings which, in turn, may change the result of some future cases.
1°2
	
N,L.R.B. 78, 102 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1979), enforced to pertinent part sub nom. Kallmann v.
N.L.R.B., 640 F.2d 1094, 1102-03, 107 L.R.R.M. 2011, 2017-18 (9th Cir. 1981).
103 282 N.L.R.B. No. 151 at 4, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1242.
1 °4 Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 28 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1951); Terrell Machine Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 1480, 70 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969). See generally Ray, Withdrawal of Recognition from an Incumbent
Union tinder the National Labor Relations Act: An Appraisal, 28 VILL. L. Ri:N. 869 (1983).
1 °' Pittsburgh & New England Trucking Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 833, 836, 104 L.R.R.M. 1287, 1288
(1980); Chicago Magnesium Castings Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 668, 674, 107 L.R.R.M. 1344, 1345 (1981).
j°6 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
14	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:1
In a number of cases, the Board found the employer's evidence insufficient to
support its asserted doubt. In Cowles Publishing Co., 107 for example, the Board majority
found an employer's withdrawal of recognition illegal because it was not based on
objective considerations sufficient to support the employer's alleged belief that the union
no longer represented a majority of employees. Chairman Dotson would have found the
withdrawal legal because it was based in part on seven months of union inactivity during
negotiations and the high turnover of employees.'" Similarly, in Aquaslide N' Dive
Corp.," withdrawal of recognition was inappropriate because only 97 of 248 unit em-
ployees were shown to no longer wish representation.
In other cases, employer unfair labor practices invalidated the employer's reliance
on statements from a majority of employees. In Hearst Corp.,uo for example, three
decertification petitions signed by a majority of employees were held insufficient to
support a withdrawal because, both before and during circulation of the petitions, the
employer solicited employees to repudiate the union, interrogated employees, promised
better benefits, instructed employees how to resign from the union, and urged employees
to sign the petitions. Similar results were reached in Architectural Woodwork Corp.,"' where
the employer had solicited employees to file a decertification petition, and in Huhn
Industries, 112 where an employee petition rejecting the union resulted from the employer's
unlawful poll of employee union sentiments.
The Buckley Broadcasting 113 ruling that replacement workers hired during a strike
will be presumed neither to support or oppose the incumbent union is not without
107 280 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 123 L.R.R.M. 1013 (1986).
los Id. at 7, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1015.
100 281 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 123 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1986).
no 281 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 123 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1986). With regard to the employer's argument
that employees were unaware of its unlawful acts and therefore such acts did not taint the petitions,
the majority stated:
Nor is a different result warranted merely because the Respondent was able to produce
19 employee witnesses who testified that they were unaware of the Respondent's
unlawful conduct. Where, as here, an employer engages in unlawful activity aimed
specifically at causing employee disaffection with their union, its misconduct, we find,
will bar any reliance on an expression of disaffection by its employees, notwithstanding
that some employees may profess ignorance of their employer's misconduct. An em-
ployer that has engaged in unlawful conduct, of the type engaged in by the Respon-
dent, cannot expect to take advantage of the chance occurrence that some of its
employees may be unaware of its actions. For as the Board has previously stated, an
employer who engages in efforts to have its employees repudiate their union must be
held responsible for the forseeable consequence of its conduct.
Id. at	 123 L.R.R.M. at 1242. Chairman Dotson noted that he does not agree that employer
unfair labor practices should "ipso facto" prevent an employer from establishing that a decertifi-
cation petition signed by a majority of employees was untainted by unlawful conduct. Id. at
n.11, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1243 n.11.
111 280 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 123 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1986).
112 283 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 124 L.R.R.M. 1352 (1987); see also Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 283
N.L.R.B. No. 161, 125 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1987) (statements of disaffection with union from less than
20 percent of employees held not to constitute sufficient basis for withdrawal of recognition). A
poll of employees taken three months after the withdrawal was found illegal because it was under-
mined by the unlawful withdrawal and thus lacked an objective basis. Id. at 6, 125 L.R.R.M. at
1123. Chairman Dotson dissented.
11 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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common sense. The idea that persons who cross a union picket line should be presumed
to support the very union that is trying to get them dismissed is very hard to accept."'
A "no presumption" rule has much to recommend it and has been suggested in the
past. "5 The Buckley Broadcasting ruling does, however, expose the weakness of the entire
concept of recognition withdrawal. Should an employer be able to refuse to bargain with
an incumbent union based on a "good faith doubt" when neither the employer nor the
employees have chosen to pursue a decertification election on their own? Unfair labor
practice proceedings to test the validity of the employer's doubt can take years, while an
election could be conducted in days." 6 1f the Buckley Broadcasting rule unacceptably alters
the balance of economic weapons between employer and union, the answer may lie in
reexamining the entire test for withdrawal rather than creating presumptions of doubtful
validity.
14 See generally Note, The Strikers' Replacements Presumption and an Employer's Duty to Bargain with
the Incumbent Union, 21 B.C.L. REV. 455 (1980). See also Ray, supra note 104. The question of how
to treat replacement workers hired to take the place of economic strikers has a checkered history.
In Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466 (1962), the Board held that when
permanent replacements constitute a majority of the unit, reasonable grounds exist to question the
union's continued majority support. Similarly, in Arkay Packaging Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 397, 94
L.R.R.M. 1197 (1976), the Board majority distinguished a normal turnover situation from the strike
replacement situation and stated that in the circumstances of that case "it would be wholly unwar-
ranted and unrealistic to presume as a matter of law that, when hired, the replacements for the
union employees who had gone out on strike favored representation by the Unions to the same
extent as the strikers." Id. at 397.-98, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1198. See also Beacon Upholstery Co., 226
N.L.R.B. 1360, 94 L.R.R.M. 1334 (1976). Only six months after its decision in Arkay, however, the
Board decided Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 95 L.R.R.M. 1565
(1977), a case involving a strike by nurses and other hospital personnel. There, a unanimous Board
announced that the presumption or union support would apply in the strike situation, stating,
Tale general rule ... is that new employees, including striker replacements, are presumed to
support the union in the same ratio as those whom they have replaced." Id. at 1070, 95 L.R.R.M.
at 1566. The Board has continued to apply this rule in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Pennco, Inc.,
250 N.L.R.B. 716, 104 L.R.R.M. 1473 (1980), enforced, 684 F.2d 340, 111 L.R.R.M. 2821 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994, 111  L.R.R.M. 2823 (1982). In November, 1982 the Court denied certiorari
to Pennco, a withdrawal of recognition case in which the Sixth Circuit rejected the employer's
argument that striker replacements should be held not to support the union. Justice White, with
whom Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari. In their
view:
The questions of whether presumptions can properly be used to determine whether
a union has the support of striker replacements, and whether replacements should be
presumed to oppose the certified union or favor the certified union, have produced
conflict among the Courts of Appeals and between the Courts of Appeals and the
agency charged with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act. The questions are
of obvious significance to national labor policy. The need for a uniform approach to
these questions is equally obvious.
459 U.S. at 996, 111 L.R.R.M. at 2824 (White, J., dissenting).
115 See Ray, supra note 104, at 903.
16
 For a suggestion that the legislative history of the Act does not support continuation of the
withdrawal of recognition concept after 1947, see Ray, Industrial Stability and Decertification Elections:
Need for Reform, 1984 Am. ST. L.J. 257.
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V. INDIVIDUALS IN A NON-UNION SETTING
The rights of non-union employees under the Act.'" have been much debated in
recent years. In its 1984 decision in Meyers Induslries," 8 the Board overruled prior
precedent"g which found implied concerted action, and therefore legal protection, when
an employee takes individual action that also affects fellow workers. It dismissed the
complaint of a non-union truckdriver who was fired after first refusing to follow his
employer's order to drive a defective truck-trailer to Michigan from Tennessee and then
filing a safety complaint with a state commission. The Board held that the driver's actions
were not protected concerted activity because they were not "with or on the authority
of other employees." 12° The Board reaffirmed its position in 1986 after the case was
remanded from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.' 2 '
While Meyers II makes it unlikely that the Meyers standard will soon be overruled,
more recent decisions of the Board, in which new members of the Board have partici-
pated, 122
 indicate that Meyers may not be read as narrowly as first feared. Two recent
decisions, over strong dissents by Chairman Dotson, seem to withdraw from an expansive
reading of Meyers. In Every Woman's Place,'" a Board majority distinguished Meyers and
found that the employer violated the Act by discharging an employee for calling the
Wage and Hour Division of U.S. Department of Labor to inquire about employees' rights
regarding working on holidays. The call constituted concerted activity, in the majority's
view, because the employee and co-workers previously had discussed overtime compen-
sation with an employer official and the call was a "logical outgrowth of the original
protest." 124 The majority found the call "sufficiently linked to group activity" 125 to con-
stitute concerted activity and found it immaterial that the employee followed express
instructions from other employees. Chairman Dotson dissented, in part, on the grounds
that there was no evidence the employee acted on the authority of any employees when
she made the call, nor any evidence that the employees intended to take the matter any
further or to select the employee as their spokesperson. Chairman Dotson accused his
'" Section 7 of the Act protects non-union employees by providing:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
114
 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984) [hereinafter Meyers I], remanded sub nom. Prill
v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 118 L.R.R.M. 2649 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 313, 120 L.R.R.M.
3392 (1985), reaffirmed, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. 1137 (1986) [hereinafter Meyers II].
12 See, e.g., Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975).
' 2° Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029..
'" Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. 1137 (1986).
122 Only Chairman Dotson and Members Babson and Stephens participated in the Meyers II
decision. Member Johansen did not participate. Id. at 1 n.1, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1137 n. 1. Member
Cracraft had not yet taken office.
In 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 124 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1986).
144 1d. at 2, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1001.
' 25 Id. at 1-2, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1001.
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colleagues of ignoring the dictates of Meyers and reviving prior and overruled precedent.
He termed the "legal outgrowth" argument a legal fiction. 126
Similarly, in Salisbury Hotel,'" a Board panel majority found that an employee
engaged in protected activity when she complained to her employer and co-workers
about the employer's lunch hour policy and called the Department of Labor. Even though
the employees did not specifically direct her to make the call, the Board panel majority
found the call protected because it "logically grew out of the employees' concerted
efforts" and was "therefore a 'continuation' of that concerted activity." 128 In a concurring
opinion, Chairman Dotson stated that he would not find the Labor Department call a
concerted activity.L 29
Every Woman's Place and Salisbury Hotel indicate that Meyers will not always be read
to require that employees explicitly deputize an employee to act on their behalf. The
developing "logical outgrowth" standard is yet of uncertain dimensions, however, and it
is not clear when it will protect employees. Other recent cases, too, indicate a willingness
to protect individual rights in a variety of settings. In Joseph D. Rario, DMD,'" a Board
panel found that the employer violated the Act by discharging a dental hygienist who
was authorized by co-workers to discuss with management employee complaints about
overtime and uniform allowances. The Board panel held that the employer's asserted
reasons for discharge were pretextual. In New Horizons for the Retarded, Ine., 131 the Board
panel held that the employer violated the Act by discharging the leader of a planned
sick-out. Because the sick-out was a one-time incident rather than a pattern of intermit-
tent strikes, the Board found it protected.
In Buck Brown Contracting,'" the Board held that an individual represented by a
union has protected individual rights outside the union relationship. The Board panel
majority found that an employee was engaged in protected activity and illegally dis-
charged when he tried to assist an unlawfully discharged co-employee to gain reem-
ployment with the company. In response to the argument that such activity could
undermine the exclusive representative, the Board panel majority stated that the em-
ployee "was not engaged in collective bargaining; rather, he was involved in classic
concerted activity — joining with another to seek employment."'"
Finally, the current Board has given employees a certain latitude within which to
exercise their rights. In Consumers Power Co.,'" a Board panel held unlawful the discharge
of a meter reader who complained about a supervisor's failure to provide police protec-
tion to another employee who had been kicked by a customer. The majority found it
not dispositive that the meter reader became upset, cursed, and reflexively raised his
fists to the supervisor when the supervisor moved his hands in front of the meter reader ;
The majority stated:
126 Id, at 8, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1003.
127 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 125 L.R.R.M. 1020 (1987).
128 Id. at 7, 125 L.R.R.M, at 1022.
128 Id. at 10, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1022 (Dotson, Chairman, concurring).
120
	
N.L.R.B. No. 86, 125 L.R.R.M. 1024 (1987).
im 282 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 124 L.R.R.M, 1181 (1987).
in 283 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 124 L.R.R.M. 1379 (1987).
128 Id. at 5 n,6, 124 L.R.R.M. at 1381 n.ti.
184 282 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 123 L.R.R.M, 1305 (1986).
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The Board has long held, however, that there are certain parameters within
which employees may act when engaged in concerted activities. The protec-
tions Section 7 affords would be meaningless were we not to take in account
the realities of industrial life and the fact that disputes over wages, hours,
and working conditions are among the disputes most likely to engender ill
feelings and strong responses. Thus, when an employee is discharged for
conduct that is part of the res gestae of protected activities, the relevant
question is whether the conduct is so egregious as to take it outside the
protection of the Act, or of such a character as to render the employee unfit
for further service. We do not believe [the employee] crossed that line.'"
Chairman Dotson dissented on the grounds that the employee's actions were not con-
certed and that, in any event, he had exceeded the scope of protection by assaulting his
supervisor.'"
Conclusion
The above cases demonstrate that resort to the National Labor Relations Board does
not have to be a futile exercise for employees and unions. Recent decisions demonstrate
that employees are protected in their right to select a union by decisions limiting em-
ployer interrogation"' and coercive speech,'" and protecting their right to obtain elec-
tions by use of authorization cards.'" Recent decisions recognize the union's right to.do
its job at the bargaining table by limiting the employer's right to relocate without
bargaining"G and requiring the employer to provide relevant information to the union."'
Other decisions recognize the employer's duty to bargain with its employees' represen-
tative and do not easily allow the employer to evade its bargaining responsibilities in
successor situations 12 or by attempted withdrawal of recognition." 5 Finally, despite the
decisions in Meyers 1144 and Meyers II 145 the Section 7 rights of non-union employees are
recognized in many situations."G
A close review of many of these opinions reveals what appears to be careful and
studied decision-making. The Board applies precedent or distinguishes prior rulings
with care and many opinions contain dozens of footnotes attempting to explain why a
154 Id. at 8,123 L.R.R.M. at 1307. In Marko Enterprises, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 112,125 L.R.R.M.
1044 (1987), however, an employee was found to have crossed the line. Engaged in the protected
activity of speaking with the employer's president on the plant floor in the presence of co-workers,
the employee insulted and directed obscenities at the president and refused to leave unless he was
fired. The discharge was found lawful.
16 282 N.L.R,B. No. 24 at 11-13,123 L.R.R.M. at 1307-08.
1 " See supra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
L35 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
141' See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 118,120 and accompanying text.
HS See supra notes 118,121 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text.
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particular decision is or is not inconsistent with past precedent." 7 This is not to say,
however, that labor's 1985 criticisms of the law are no longer of concern. While current
cases carefully apply and distinguish precedent in a principled fashion, the precedent
applied includes the 1983-85 cases about which labor complained. While the Board
distinguished Rossmore Hamel" and found some interrogation unlawful,'" the case was
not overruled. While Otis Elevator Co. 15° was carefully distinguished to find that some
relocations and plant closings require prior collective bargaining,' 51 it likewise was not
overruled. While Meyers 152 was limited and distinguished in cases protecting individual
rights, 15 ' it was reaffirmed, not overruled. Finally, Clear Pine Mouldings,'" as applied,
created a new code of conduct for picket line activity.'"
Other long standing problems have not disappeared. Professor Charles Morris, for
example, has argued that Board enforcement of core employee protections has been
"woefully inadequate" and that substantial restructuring and procedural reform is nec-
essary to enable the NLRB to perform its statutory objectives in these areas. 156 His review
of NLRB annual reports indicates that between 1962 and 1981, a time when union
organizational activity was declining, discriminatory discharges and refusal to bargain
charges increased dramatically.' 57 We must ask whether any Board, whatever its political
background, can effectively control an employer that chooses to violate the law.
Another problem that remains is that of delay. A number of the 1986 and 1987
cases discussed above involve incidents which occurred in 1981 and 1982. 158 With regard
to interference with elections, collective bargaining, successorship, and withdrawal of
recognition, delay is fatal to employees' right to representation. After a four to six year
hiatus, a bargaining order cannot restore to employees their prior effective representa-
tion. The demonstrated futility of the union throughout such delay undercuts the
support of even the most ardent union supporter. Normal turnover over such a period
will further erode majority support and thus the effectiveness of the representation.
In summary, the union rhetoric of 1985 no longer fully applies. If one of the
purposes of such rhetoric was to slow the rate of change and moderate the influence of
employers, it has been partially successful. Resort to the Board is not futile and boycotting
the Board in every case could forfeit some of the protections to which employees are
legally entitled. The guiding precedents of 1984-85 do survive, however, and the law
which is now applied in Washington includes those decisions which so discouraged labor.
1" See, e.g., Every Woman's Place, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 124 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1986).
145 See supra notes 6, 23-26 and accompanying text.
115
 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
is° See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
156 Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House—Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 9, 17 (1987).
157 Id. at 20.
156 See, e.g., Creative Food Design, 282 N.L.R.B, No. 171, 124 L.R,R.M. 1273 (1987) (five years);
Atlantic Forest Prods., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 124' L.R.R.M. 1127 (1987) (six years); Consumers
Power Co., 282 N,L.R.B, No, 24, 123 L.R.R.M, 1305 (1986) (five years); Cowles Publishing Co.,
280 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 123 L.R.R.M. 1013 (1986) (five years).
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Furthermore, uncertainty exists as to where lines will be drawn regarding election
campaign propaganda, interrogation, bargaining duties, and individual rights. Such
uncertainty may cause some employers to stray too close to the line in areas where there
are few effective remedies for illegal activity. As with many areas of the law, there are
few clear cut answers. We must look to future decisions to determine whether the
tempering influence noted here will continue.
